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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Ladies and gentlemen, tonight, we will concern ourselves with the 
simple question I’ve been asked many times since coming to 
Bamberg: what are you doing here? Or, in more formal terms: why 
should political scientists concern themselves with complex and 
innovative technological systems? What is the political dimension of 
technology? We will try to find some first answers to these questions. 
Naturally, we can only hope to scratch the surface in the limited time 
available for an inaugural lecture but let’s try regardless.  
At first sight, we can already see some clear linkages between 
technology, policy and politics, if only because certain policies 
promote or restrain technological development. It is generally 
reckoned that Bavaria features one of the most advanced research and 
knowledge infrastructures in Germany, if not in Europe.1 This does 
not only concern sectors traditional to Bavaria such as the automotive 
industry or mechanical engineering, but also biotechnology, 
technology for health care and IT. The strength of this infrastructure 
does not only derive from enterprises doing well and investing wisely, 
it is also because the Bavarian government has targeted and sustained 
policies towards promoting research and development, investing 
approximately 15% of its annual state budget in research and 
development. The complete research and development budget, 
brought together by both the private sector and the State, adds up to 
about 12.2 billion euros annually. This amounts to 3.2% of the 
Bavarian GDP, which is, which is quite above the German (2.8% in 
2014) and European average.2 
Innovation and technology is something that the state as a whole 
benefits from – for example directly through sales and taxes, or 
indirectly through the creation of jobs and cluster-effects. As such, 
there are ample reasons for politicians and administrative to develop 
policies in order to keep research and development going. Koschatzky 
& Stahlecker identify at least 12 major technology and innovation 
policy programs in Bavaria, aimed at (among others) public venture 
capital companies (e.g. Bayern Kapital), establishing and reinforcing 
regional clusters (e.g. BioMünchen), promoting research 
collaboration between public research organizations and the private 
                                                 
1 Koschatzky & Stahlecker (2010) 
2 Bayerische Staatsregierung (2011)  
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sector (e.g. Bayerische Forschungsstiftung) and more.3 One notable 
observation we can make about Bavaria is that the development of 
technology takes place in clusters of both private and public entities, 
such as schools and research institutes. The State of Bavaria considers 
these clusters as pivotal to Bavaria’s economy and many policies are 
geared towards strengthening those clusters. In other words, 
technological innovations are as much a matter of policies and politics 
as it is about hiring good engineers. Let’s examine that argument in 
closer detail.  
I will first make the argument that technological systems can’t be 
understood without their social and political contexts. We should 
therefore talk about coupled socio-technological systems. I will then 
demonstrate how such coupled socio-technological systems feature 
complex properties that prohibit straightforward attempts at 
governing them.4 I will conclude the argument with a discussion of 
what these ideas require from us academics, students and 
practitioners – and will make the argument that complexity is 
something we ought to embrace.  
 
 
2 WHY TECHNOLOGY? 
 
As you already could suspect from the introduction, there is a strong 
economic argument for the development of technologies: it brings in 
jobs and economic growth and tends to contribute to the welfare of a 
state. Indeed, the official viewpoint of the Bavarian government is that 
Bavaria needs to be strong developing high-tech products and services 
in order to keep competing with other countries, if only because 
Bavaria doesn’t have any significant stock of raw materials to export.  
So technology it is. The reasoning goes that large-scale innovation is a 
necessary but risky endeavor because it is unclear whether there will 
be a return on investment for individual companies. There are many 
                                                 
3 Koschatzky & Stahlecker, 2010: 17 
4 There is a great temptation to display scientific strength by flooding the audience with 
huge numbers of references and in-depth analyses of current debates about complex 
systems. I would rather focus on some core ideas and practical examples. For a more 
thorough overview, please refer to Gerrits (2012). Also, I’m indebted to the many 
scholars before me who have cleared many pathways. I just realized it is exactly 25 years 
ago that Walter Kickert held his inaugural lecture entitled ‘Complexity, self-steering and 
dynamics’. How time flies. 
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failed attempts for every successful technology. Also, it can be 
expected that part of the research output spills over to other firms, 
who imitate the innovation without carrying the burden of the 
investment5, e.g. through reverse engineering. This is a clear case of 
market failure.6 But if research and development contributes to the 
national economy, it can be reasoned that governments should step in 
to mitigate the risk using subsidies – after all, such subsidies could 
(potentially) act as multipliers for income.  
Subsidizing research and development, in particular when there is a 
promise of direct utility, is therefore relatively little controversial and 
gets support from left, right and center. For example, the Bavarian 
government started subsidizing regional innovative clusters, such as 
the IT-sector in Munich, which in over a decade lead to an increase of 
innovative capacities by 4.6 to 5.7 percentage points while research 
and development expenditures by private enterprises decreased by 
almost 20% on average during the same period7. In other words: 
these cluster-oriented policies had achieved exactly what was expected 
from them. Or, to use another example, the European Commission 
justified spending 80 billion Euros on research by saying that it is “[…] 
seen as a means to drive economic growth and create jobs, our 
subsidy program has the political backing of Europe’s leaders and the 
Members of the European Parliament. They agreed that research is an 
investment in our future and so put it at the heart of the EU’s 
blueprint for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth and jobs.”8. In 
short: there is an economic or even financial motive to engage with 
technological innovation.  
Having said that, the market-failure argument is undermined by 
empirical studies that show that subsidies are relatively ineffective in 
promoting technological innovations. Gaillard-Ladinska and 
colleagues9 carried out a meta-study and found out that a “[…] 
reduction of R&D subsidies only leads to 1-2 percent more private 
R&D investment. This suggests that in the absence of subsidies, most 
private investments in R&D would still have been carried out.”10. That 
                                                 
5 Frenken (2016)  
6 Arrow (1962) 
7 Falck, Heblich, & Kipar (2010) 
8 https://ec.europa.eu/programmes/horizon2020/en/what-horizon-2020 retrieved on 
May 29th, 2016 
9 Gaillard-Ladinska, Non, & Straathof (2015)  
10 In: Frenken (2016) 
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is actually something many parties are aware of. The economic 
argument is therefore not the only driver behind technological 
innovation.  
Another, important, reason for technology is what Bent Flyvbjerg calls 
‘frictionless society’ or zero-friction society11. This constitutes a 
society where we can achieve more with less effort, a society where we 
have liberated ourselves from the constraints of space and time. 
Naturally, technology plays a very important role in this. We may be 
looking for easier ways to do our dishes or easier ways to travel to 
distant countries or to the highest mountain tops or easier ways to do 
complicated calculations or better ways of saving lives in the hospital. 
We even spend precious brain capacity to build apps for our 
smartphones so we can watch pictures of cats on the internet at 2am 
instead of sleeping. 
Once we have embarked on that road towards technologies that 
promise lesser friction, we need other technologies to achieve that. I 
think that most people will agree that smartphones are making live a 
little easier in a number of ways, in particular when you ought to 
study but really want to see those cats online, but the construction of 
smartphones requires rare metals to be produced. These are hard to 
extract so we need specific technologies to extracts those raw 
materials. The tools needed for that also require specific technologies, 
and so we embark on a route where we need technology in order to 
make technology that will make our lives a little easier. In doing that, 
we create a system of interlocking technologies.  
I don’t know if we are creeping closer to that Utopia of being 
independent from space and time, and I don’t know if it would be a 
desirable goal in the first place. What matters to me is that it is an 
important driver behind technological development. But still, money 
and convenience do not explain all the reasons for that development.  
The third reason why we invent and use new technologies is often 
overlooked or goes unmentioned but I believe it is a very important 
one: we do it because we want and can do it. Or, in the words of Karen 
Frick, because technological progress delivers us rapture and the 
sublime, and that is a goal in itself12. For example, there are many 
good reasons not to build a tower with a height of almost 900 meters 
but yet the Burj Khalifa is there because, as Sheikh Mohammed bin 
                                                 
11 Flyvbjerg, Bruzelius, & Rothengatter (2002) 
12 Frick (2008)  
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Rashid al Maktoum said, he “wanted to put Dubai on the map with 
something really sensational.”13  
Thus, as Frick asserts, developing new technologies lead us to believe 
that we have achieved progress and that has become a value in itself, 
not to mention an important factor in politics: “The idea of progress 
creates a political dimension that can capture the imagination of 
political leaders and the public. This aspect of the technological 
sublime is […] a political tool that can be used to bolster position 
statements, increase public awareness and to fulfil personal 
interests.”14. Indeed, it is within the realm of politics where such 
‘monuments’ are hatched. Indeed, the perception of progress can 
actually help to gather public support and foster creativity but it can 
also easily lead to loss of control over the project or technology (ibid.). 
This is particularly an issue when the risks are shifted to the 
government, which then has to use tax money to salvage the project 
or program.  
For example, the German MAGLEV rail project was not only intended 
as a faster means of traveling between major cities (the zero-friction 
argument), not only as a way of demonstrating the technological 
prowess of the German industrial sector (the economic argument), it 
was done because it could be done. There had been ample warnings 
by the Scientific Advisory Council of the Ministry not to pour money 
into this project, yet it took the restructuring of Deutsche Bahn before 
the real risks were revealed and the argument that it was ‘good 
because we could’ was hollowed out.  
By now, it should be clear that there is a strong relationship between 
technology as an artefact, the meaning we assign to it and the things 
we do in order to develop technology. In fact, we can’t understand 
technology if we don’t understand the social practices it is connected 
with. Let me use an example to demonstrate that point.  
 
 
3 THE ICE-4: TECHNOLOGIES AS NEGOTIATED OUTCOMES 
 
To most people, figure 1 will just feature a picture of a brand-new 
train, in this case the German ICE-4 high-speed railway train. 
However, to me, it is primarily a technological artefact embedded in 
                                                 
13 Roth & Roth Clark (2014) 
14 2008: 242-243 
 8 
social and political ideas and practices. Let’s investigate that in more 
detail. 
 
 
Figure 1: ICE-4 High-speed trainset being tested. Photo courtesy of Siemens 
Mobility. 
Let’s take a look at the front of the train. The shape of the cab, the 
coupling and coupling doors, the size of the window pane etc. are 
strongly determined by our understanding that head-on train 
collisions are a bad idea. Therefore, we generally agree that the front 
of the train should act as a passive safety device to absorb at least part 
of the energy released during collisions, should they happen. This is 
consensus is set in European regulations that are regularly adjusted to 
reach higher safety levels. Newly designed railway vehicles are only 
admitted to the European railway network after extensive 
homologation, which includes tests for crashworthiness to see 
whether the impact protection system functions properly. That is an 
agreement made on the European level by the European Commission 
(article 26 of Directive 2008/57/EC, to be precise).  
Homologation is not a simple task. It can take years and millions of 
Euros to have a particular type admitted. It brings safety, it costs 
money and time. Consequently, the setting of standards is not a 
straightforward technocratic process. It is not just a matter of building 
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the safest trains because there are ample trade-offs: weight versus 
speed, dimensions of the structure versus the loading gauge, costs 
versus effectiveness, higher standards vs. what the industry can 
currently deliver. As such, the standards are the negotiated result of 
all parties involved who settle – temporarily – on certain agreements 
that they honor their possibilities and stakes.  
The European homologation process itself is also governed by 
multiple parties; national safety authorities, the European 
Commission and the European Railway Agency, the International 
Union of Railways, the national infrastructure providers, the 
operators, and manufacturers all play a role in this. Each actor has its 
own ideas about what is feasible and necessary and thus attempts to 
push its main points forward. In the past, each country had its own 
procedures and standards. That is slowly coming being harmonized. 
If actors from the European Member States have their own standards 
and procedures, they quite understandably believe that theirs are the 
correct ones. For example, representatives from Deutsche Bahn 
commented on the homologation process that there are “[…] certain 
differences in technical ‘philosophy’ between French and German 
Railway technology (which is based in decades of only national 
developments […]”15 And the European Railway Agency itself points 
at the ambiguous network of actors involved, saying that much 
complications arise not out of technology per se but out of “[d]ifferent 
roles and responsibilities allocated to the actors in the different EU 
Member States that hinders mutual trust and therefore mutual 
recognition.”16 In short: what we are looking at is not just a cab front, 
it is the negotiated outcome of the ideals and technical feasibilities as 
brought forward by the many parties involved in homologation. 
The thrust towards harmonization is part of a broader development in 
the European Union, namely to create a single European market. For 
the railway sector, this means that there a slow evolution towards a 
full internal market for railway services and equipment. The 
European Commission assumes that a single railway market will lead 
to better services to passengers and frictionless transport of goods 
throughout the Eurozone – the arguments of economy and zero-
friction, once more. Naturally, a single market requires 
harmonization of the technical and operational dimensions of rolling 
                                                 
15 Hoppe, Matschek & Müller (2006) 
16 European Railway Agency, 2011: 45 
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stock, as well as the infrastructure to run trains. The more uniform 
the equipment, the better operators will be able to operate everywhere 
in Europe. As mentioned above, there used to be 14 distinctively 
different standards in operation in the European Union alone. 
Harmonization is arranged by, among others, Directive 96/48/EC. 
Part of that is the development and implementation of the European 
Rail Traffic Management Systems or ERTMS. ERMTS arranges for a 
standardized dedicated mobile phone network called GSM-R, and a 
standard for operational safety, train–track communication and 
unified cab control called European Train Control System or ETCS.   
Setting the requirements within the ERMTS framework is a 
thoroughly political process. ERA, the agency overseeing the 
development and implementation of ERMTS on behalf of the 
European Commission, doesn’t superimpose its standards on the 
member states. In fact, much of what it presents to the European 
Commission has been developed by ERA’s stakeholders, which 
includes members from various ministries and regulatory bodies of 
those member states, and companies such Alstom, Thales and 
Siemens Mobility.  
While standardization and harmonization may sound attractive, 
ERMTS had received a lukewarm response from the Member States. 
For long, lack of political support meant that the standard was not 
really adopted. Ultimately, much of the support appeared to depend 
on money. Between 2007 and now, about 800 million euros from the 
EU budget has been earmarked for the development and 
implementation of the standard, to be matched by member states and 
industries. Right now, the standard is slowly implemented in the 
various railway systems across Europe, and beyond.  
However, the implementation is far from straightforward, even when 
political support is in place. ERMTS may be a standard but practice 
shows that there are still incompatibilities between manufacturers. 
For example, Stoop and colleagues demonstrated dysfunctional 
incompatibilities in the equipment from Alcatel and AnsaldoBreda in 
Belgium and the Netherlands. This was partly due to the different 
ways in which the governments of both countries thought that such 
innovations should be developed, with Belgium going for a traditional 
approach and the Dutch government hell-bent on a Public-Private 
Partnership mode. Indeed, the PPP had become the goal in itself 
 11 
rather than a means to implement the standard and safeguard 
seamless travel between Belgium and the Netherlands17. The result 
was a costly but not fully functional technical system that took 
another few years and additional investments to run properly.  
The design of the ICE-4 is not only governed by EU regulations 
concerning safety and interoperability. Accessibility of trains, the 
dimensions of the doors, and the buttons to operate them are strongly 
determined by certain accessibility standards that function as legal 
obligations. By law, trains need to be accessible for people in 
wheelchairs. The dimensions of such wheelchairs are arranged in the 
ISO standard ISO/TC 173/SC 1. ISO is the International 
Organization for Standardization, an international standard-setting 
body in the shape of an NGO. It is composed of representatives from 
various national standards bureaus or organizations who meet 
frequently to set such standards.  
This particular standard concerning wheelchairs was set in an 
international agreement in 1980 between 24 countries, including 
most of the European countries, the USA and Canada and China, and 
was chaired by the South African Bureau for Standards. This is 
because we, as a society, have an institutionalized norm that people in 
wheelchairs or that are impaired otherwise need to have access to 
public transport. Again, we are looking at a social and political process 
that has lasting impact on the technological artefact.  
So far, we have focused on the setting of technological standards that 
determine what our train looks like and how it operates – and I 
apologies for giving such a detailed account of dry rules and 
regulations. But there are also other practices at play here. In talking 
about these regulations, we should not forget about our social 
practices regarding traveling. If anything, the operator Deutsche Bahn 
and the manufacturer Siemens want to make train travel an attractive 
activity. They do so by conveying an image of comfort and luxury 
through design requirements and a narrative about the nature of the 
design. Traveling by train, they tell us in the press statement, is not 
just a utilitarian activity that you need to undertake to get from A to B, 
it is something you should enjoy and look forward to. It should give 
you the impression that you can travel effortlessly and comfortably in 
comparison to other modes of transport. Consequently, the design 
features big windows and air conditioning and a galley where you can 
                                                 
17 Stoop, Baggen, Vleugel & Vrancken (2008).  
 12 
have a bite or a drink, and WiFi-antennas so you can go online while 
traveling.  
It is easy to dismiss such words as marketing talk but that would be 
beside the point. What I want to argue here is that we, in our society, 
have a more or less coherent understanding of what constitutes a 
good way to traveling. Without that, you could just bolt seats in the 
train and be done with it. But there is a clear understanding that it is 
necessary to attract passengers because people have a choice between 
different modes of transport, some of them less efficient or more 
polluting than others. That understanding leads us to design rolling 
stock with attractive features. This is not exclusively tied to the ICE-4. 
It only takes a quick survey over recent tender requirements for local 
and regional railways to see that Passenger Transport Executives 
demand all kinds of features in order to attract passengers even to the 
humblest of railway connections.  
 
 
4 COUPLED SOCIO-TECHNOLOGICAL SYSTEMS 
 
With the knowledge we have now, we understand that at any point in 
time the faith of a certain technology is strongly influenced by the 
political and administrative considerations and actions, and by the 
social beliefs and conventions of that particular time. In other words, 
we need to understand a technology not just as a stand-alone artefact 
and not just as an artefact in a given environment but as a coupled 
socio-technological system of social and technological elements. The 
shape of a future technology depends strongly on what we currently 
believe is necessary, desirable, and feasible. This point of departure is 
advocated by, among others, Wiebe Bijker18. As he argued, political 
power is of tremendous importance in deciding the faith of socio-
technological systems. Not every social actor is equal, formal 
hierarchies and other forms of power relationships matter a lot. 
Consider, again, the relationship between ERA, the European 
Commission, the Member States represented in ERA and in the 
European Parliament. It is not hard to see that these actors are not 
equal in the powers they exert, which is reflected in the policies (e.g. 
single railway market) and the standards adopted. In short: each 
technological system is heavily embedded in social and political 
                                                 
18 Bijker (1995)  
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practices. These coupled socio-technological systems have certain 
characteristics that are conveniently summarized under the header 
‘complex’. I would now like to discuss some of the main properties of 
that complexity.  
 
 
5 PROPERTIES OF COMPLEXITY 
 
Complex systems have quite a few interesting properties that set them 
apart from complicated systems. This is not the place to present an 
exhaustive list19. For now, I want to highlight some of the most 
important ones: path-dependence, non-ergodicity, equifinality and 
multifinality, and self-organization.  
To start with the first: There is a great deal of path-dependence in 
technological systems. Path-dependence basically tells us that the 
resources necessary to do something entirely new are such that it is 
more profitable to keep doing what you have been doing instead of 
doing something new, even though the new thing may deliver better 
returns in the long run than the thing you are doing.20 21 22 In this, 
we are impeded by lack of foresight, i.e. we are unable to make 
precise predictions of which alternative is the better one.23 If a 
company is very good at building cars with internal combustion 
engines, it is very likely that its next innovation is going to be a car 
with a different engine.  
Path-dependence doesn’t only occur in single companies or 
technologies, it also holds true for cities, regions and countries.24 25 
For example, Hidalgo and colleagues showed that countries develop 
their economy by diversifying into export products that are closely 
                                                 
19 I’ve presented the properties of complex systems and related governance issues in 
among others Teisman, Van Buuren, & Gerrits (2009) and Gerrits (2012). A critical 
discussion of the state of art in governance and complexity can be found in Teisman & 
Gerrits (2014).  
20 Arthur (1994) 
21 David (1985) 
22 When applied to social science at large, path-dependence often entails that history 
matters, which is a truism. The economic, narrow, definition still is very useful for social 
science. See e.g. Gerrits & Marks (2008) for a discussion and application. 
23 E.g. David (1985) for the famous example of QWERTY 
24 Neffke, Henning, & Boschma (2011)  
25 Boschma, Minondo, & Navarro (2013) 
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related to products they already export.26 This is not just something 
that boils down being good at something continuing to be good at it, 
it actually relates to the whole physical and social infrastructure 
concerning that technology. The product is produced in a certain 
context, under specific policies, institutions and governance 
arrangements. Germany, for example, has a strong legal tradition 
where the space of possibilities is fairly well-defined. That has its 
impact on the development of technology, particularly so because 
technology can change quicker than rules and regulations. Promoting 
a culture of innovations therefore requires structural 
transformations.27 There are advantages and disadvantages to path-
dependence. A company, country or region will be king as long as 
there is a niche for the particular technology it is producing. The 
downside is that one can be doomed to run a dead-end street because 
there is simply no real opportunity to change. Thus it is that the US 
and other countries such as Norway, Italy and the Netherlands in the 
JSF-alliance keep pouring money into the F-35 fighter jet despite the 
fact that it has been delayed for years, is facing massive budget 
overruns and has a compromised operational role because it was 
originally conceived in a time when drone warfare was not even a 
remote possibility. 
If coupled socio-technological systems following certain trajectories 
through time, and if these systems are determined by the specific 
circumstances or conditions at the time of developing, then it doesn’t 
require much imagination to understand that chance plays an 
important, not to be underestimated role in the shaping of such 
trajectories. For example, the interim evaluation of the Betuweroute 
freight track between Emmerich and the Port of Rotterdam coincided 
with the disastrous fire in the Mont Blanc tunnel. Subsequently, the 
Dutch Parliament demanded a redesign of the tunnels in the railway 
project to include all kinds of new firefighting equipment. This came 
at massive costs.28  
Had the fire occurred a year later, or not at all, this technology would 
perhaps not have been used at all and the original designs would have 
been deemed sufficient. But the reality is that the tunnels have been 
                                                 
26 Hidalgo, Klinger, Barabasi & Hausmann (2007) 
27 Hidalgo, Klinger, Barabasi, & Hausmann (2007)  
28 Algemene Rekenkamer (2003) 
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redesigned and safety procedures have been altered. This is not just a 
matter of a change in the investment costs – the costs associated the 
construction itself. The decision made on the basis of that particular 
chance event keeps resonating throughout the life cycle of the tunnel 
in the shape of e.g. maintenance costs and mandatory fire drills. In 
other, more formal terms, coupled socio-technological systems deal 
with non-ergodic chance events: the occurrence of chance, the results 
of which keep being present throughout the existence of the 
technology. For the researcher, the occurrence of chance provides us 
with a motive to develop complexity-sensitive modes of analysis. This 
I find particularly important in the face of certain research methods 
that do not just overlook the occurrence of chance but even 
deliberately try to remove chance events from the analysis. Turn that 
around! Chance is an important explanatory factor. In fact, chance 
may be the most stable factor in complex systems.29  
Let’s continue thinking along this path and examine the second 
property. If we understand that there can be variance in starting 
conditions and therefore in the outcomes due to path-dependence and 
non-ergodicity, as we have just seen in the previous example, then we 
need to think about the nature of the outcomes. The reality of 
complex systems is such that the trajectories starting under similar 
conditions still can bring forth different outcomes (multifinality) or, 
conversely, that trajectories starting under different conditions can 
bring forth similar outcomes (equifinality), an argument expanded 
upon in Gerrits & Verweij, 2013.  
For example, Flyvbjerg and colleagues30 found that the Eurotunnel, 
the Great Belt Link and the Øresund had very similar outcomes in 
terms of massive budget overruns and missed deadlines. However, a 
closer look reveals that safety concerns where the main cause for that 
in the Eurotunnel, but not in the Great Belt Link, where the budget 
overruns were due to environmental concerns, accidents with 
flooding and a devastating fire during the construction. For the 
                                                 
29 There is much potential in longitudinal, complexity-informed and time-sensitive 
methods for the social sciences. I had a first attempt in Gerrits (2008) and Gerrits (2011) 
but a much better starting point here would be the work of Andrew Abbott (e.g. 2001). 
For a thorough application and functional model in the realm of politics and policy-
making, see Spekkink (2015). An expanded argument of time-sensitive methods in 
combination with models from evolutionary biology is part of my forthcoming book with 
Peter Marks (2016).  
30 Flyvbjerg, Bruzelius & Rothengatter (2002) 
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Øresund link, then, it turned out that the costs of building major 
transport links in a densely populated Copenhagen were a magnitude 
higher than forecasted. In other words, what we have here are three 
fairly over-priced links across water (similar), yet the conditions differ 
massively. 
The converse can also occur: similar conditions bringing about very 
different results. Take my home town, Rotterdam, for example. 
During the financial crisis, there were very little means to regenerate 
run-down buildings and areas so alternative solutions had to be 
found, at least until the next investor was found. The general idea is 
that the area should be opened up for temporary initiatives that can 
start there in a low-key, low-cost fashion with the express purpose of 
bring back some liveliness and economic or cultural activities to the 
area. The wildest dream is that such initiatives drive gentrification 
and cause the real estate value to go up again. The trade-off is that 
those initiatives need to leave on short notice should investors 
become interested again.  
This type of temporary land use and urban improvisation is not 
exclusive to Rotterdam or the Netherlands. You have the same here in 
Germany in the shape of so-called Zwischennutzung31 and it is also 
experimented with in the USA. The cases I refer to are Schieblock and 
Zomerhofkwartier. These two cases are at a stone’s throw from each 
other and both feature considerable abandoned office space but no 
current incentive to redevelop them. Both were subjected to the same 
treatment of temporary use. Yet, the one project turned into a kind of 
office hub cum Biergarten cum coffee bar for hipsters, and slowly 
developed in a commercially viable place. The other one also 
developed but rather than evolving into something office-oriented, it 
appeared to attract small-scale manufacturing and artists. So here we 
have it: same city, same neighborhood, same situation with 
abandoned offices, same basic approach, but different results (and 
positive ones at that).  
The consequences of these two aspects are clear. To the researcher, it 
means that any comparative analysis has account for the context in 
which the phenomenon occurs.32 For the practitioners, such as urban 
                                                 
31 Chang (2016)  
32 As argued elsewhere, a comparative method such as QCA has the power of 
uncovering the complexities of equifinality and multifinality, provided the method is used 
in a complexity-informed way (Gerrits, 2012; Gerrits & Verweij, 2013). A thorough 
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planners, project managers at a company, or politicians, it means that 
what works in one place may not necessarily work in another place, 
and that small changes can magnify in the long-term outcomes. This 
is less trivial than it seems once you realize how often things that 
work in one place are copied with the idea that it will also work 
elsewhere. This is not necessarily so. 
The last characteristic of complexity I would like to mention here is 
self-organization. In formal terms, self-organization means the 
emergence of structure without a super-imposed design.33 In other 
words: the structure emerges – literally – out of the interaction 
between the elements of the system. As a result, the resulting 
structure can’t be traced back to its roots in a linear fashion. We find 
this property to be a persistent one, i.e. it seems to be at the basis of 
many complex systems. For researchers, self-organizing principles 
offer the keys to the inner dynamics of complex systems.  
A second explanation, one that seems to resonate a lot in practice 34, 
is that self-organization concerns the empirical observation that 
people are very good at evading governmental steering attempts, i.e. 
they self-organize despite or because of such attempts. Consider how 
people walk through cities and how they create patterns of movement 
and conventions of how to use the public space. In that sense, I think 
that the Kettenbrücke does a neat job of relying on some self-
organizing abilities of people to manage the different traffic flows. 
The reconstructed Langenstrasse, however, functions poorly despite - 
or even because of – the many signs and markers on the road.  
 
 
6 MANIFESTATIONS OF COMPLEXITY 
 
What we have discussed so far are some of the basic principles of 
complex coupled socio-technological systems. I would like also like to 
discuss some of the ways in which these principles become manifest 
in the practice of governing them. For example, if the evolution of 
such systems has a degree of unpredictability, then it doesn’t come as 
a surprise that this has an impact on politics. Consider, if you will, the 
                                                                                                   
application of the method to uncover complexity in real cases can be found in Verweij 
(2015). Methodological guidelines can be found in Byrne & Ragin (2009) 
33 Cilliers (1998) 
34 De Bruijn & Gerrits (2016)  
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Fukushima disaster and the effect it had on Germany’s energy 
policies.  
Statistically speaking, the Fukushima disaster didn’t change much in 
terms of the risks of nuclear power. Yes, it was a real disaster in the 
sense that factors combined in ways that were unforeseen during the 
design stage – the classic scenario as laid out in Perrow’s normal 
accidents theory.35 But no matter how severe the disaster, one can 
argue that the basics of nuclear power generation and its calculated 
risks are just the same as they have been prior to Fukushima: nuclear 
power plants are generally safe but there is always a small chance that 
things go wrong – the proverbial black swan.36 However, for the 
German government, it was a clear signal that the effects of such a 
disaster – no matter how small the chance – would be unacceptable. 
In her speech to the Bundestag, Chancellor Merkel remarked that she 
believed the statistically small risks to be manageable. But that was 
before Fukushima happened. The occurrence of the disaster caused 
her to reconsider her stance fundamentally and to start winding down 
nuclear power generation in Germany.  
The thing that has been haunting socio-technological systems for ever 
– and as has been exemplified by the speech by Mrs. Merkel – is that 
statistical risk assessment and risk distributions don’t hold much 
meaning with most people. What people actually experience when 
dealing with complex systems is uncertainty and depending on a 
number of personal characteristics, they will approach that 
uncertainty differently. Do you believe that you are on your own and 
that the government is doing to you whatever it pleases? You will have 
a very different risk perception than people who think that all 
uncertainties can and should be solved in collective efforts.37 That risk 
perception is an important explanatory factor for the ways in which 
we deal with technologies.  
Earlier, I already referred to the fact that socio-technology systems are 
developed in networks of multiple and diverse actors.38 This is 
exemplified in e.g. public-private partnerships and stakeholder 
involvement. Public-private partnerships, by no means a new thing, 
                                                 
35 Perrow (1984) 
36 Taleb (2007) 
37 Douglas & Wildavsky (1982) 
38 E.g. Klijn & Koppenjan (2015) for a thorough overview of literature related to public 
and public-private networks.  
 19 
provide a way of combining public and private resources and of 
distributing risks between parties in establishing new, and sometimes 
risky, technological systems. Another aspect of this this networked 
society is the fact that lay people want to have a say about what is 
decided for them.39  
A well-known recent example here in Germany is the societal protests 
against Stuttgart 21. The government of Baden-Württemberg took a 
heavy-handed approach towards silencing the protesters, which 
backfired spectacularly in the next elections. Somehow, this is a 
familiar pattern: legally and technically speaking everything seems to 
be in order, yet people don’t like it much. But the strategy to decide – 
announce – defend simply isn’t functional anymore in a highly 
dynamic situation. As we know by now, developing and 
implementing technology is not a straightforward technicality: 
societal actors will have their own ideas and sometimes complete 
disagreements and ignoring that won’t make things better or easier – 
tempting though that may seem.  
A third appearance of complexity is the different time scales at which 
things develop. Technology can and often will develop quicker than 
e.g. law. A very recent example is block chain technology, the driver 
behind virtual currencies such as Bitcoin. In short, blockchain 
technology revolves around a distributed (i.e. non-centralized) 
database that maintains a growing list of data entries that are unique 
and can’t be altered after recording them. Due to its structure, it is 
very reliable in verifying the integrity of the data. Most people will 
recognize blockchain technology in the shape of Bitcoin but there are 
other applications too. As a so-called crypto-currency, which is what 
Bitcoin basically is, it has the potential to provide a stable and secure 
way of e.g. managing communication between banks. This could 
lower the transaction costs and increase the speed of transactions. But 
many people will also recognize Bitcoin as the de-facto standard for 
shady businesses on the internet. For example, the Silk Road online 
black market where people could order illegal drugs, utilized Bitcoins 
to ease anonymous transactions between sellers and buyers. As such, 
blockchain technology has become a public issue with strengths and 
weaknesses.  
The working group of the European Parliament, headed by Mr. Jakob 
Von Weizsäcker, just tried figuring out whether this would be 
                                                 
39 Edelenbos, Schie & Gerrits (2010)  
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something that needed to be regulated and, if so, in what ways. If you 
don’t regulate, the technology may run out of control and cause many 
problems. If you do regulate right away, you may stifle innovation. 
Last week, the working group asked the Commission to monitor but 
not (yet) regulate the technology. 
The debate about blockchain technology demonstrates the tensions 
between technological innovation and political and regulatory 
answers. Generally speaking, technology develops much quicker than 
politicians and administration can cope with. A legal change to 
regulate blockchain technology properly will take years to develop. 
The report of the working group came out last week and treats the 
technology as new and upcoming. But remember, the technology 
itself is almost a decade old by now. If it will ever come to a European 
legal framework, it could easily be years after the technology emerged. 
This is not to say that the political responses are too slow, not at all. I 
just want to point out that there are often considerable misfits 
between the pace of technological innovation and political and legal 
response. As Von Weizsäcker demonstrated, such delays can be 
beneficial in giving room for a technology to develop – hence, I like to 
call them ‘timely misfits’. And let me stress that this gap occurs 
everywhere, not just in the ‘high-level’ politics of the European 
Parliament. It can also occur right here in Bamberg. As a tourist 
destination, how is the city going to deal with AirBnB? With Uber? 
The technologies are there (I know, I’ve rented my first apartment 
here through AirBnB!) so it is time for the city to start thinking about 
what to do. Mind, the answer could still be ‘do nothing’. But an 
answer is required.  
 
 
7 IMPLICATIONS FOR RESEARCHERS 
 
We have now discussed some of the ways in which complexity 
appears in the reality of governing technological systems. The 
question is now what this requires from us, scientists. I wouldn’t 
want to bother you with all kinds of technical details of the research 
process, such as how to solve logical remainders or whether 
technology users should be modeled as a box variable or auxiliary 
variable. I fully understand that scientists are inclined to jump on 
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such issues and don’t underestimate how much I would like to go 
into the finer details of methods.40  
But let’s face it: these are not the most exciting things to discuss right 
now. Instead, I would like to focus on the more general approach to 
scientific research and the research process. If it is true – and let’s 
assume that for the moment – that socio-technological systems are 
contextual and need to be studied contextually, then it is inevitable 
that we go out and study them in actual practice rather than from the 
confines of the study room. We need, in the words of David Byrne 
(the British sociologist, not the singer of the Talking Heads!) “[…] 
down and dirty empiricism”41, grounded in the empirical word. We 
need to touch, smell and taste it. It is only in confrontation with 
reality that we start to appreciate the value of our theories and 
assumptions.  
Theories in the social science often work by the grace of gross 
abstractions or simplifications. There may be some utility in that and 
I agree that it is actually impossible to build a theoretical framework 
or model that fully captures all the properties of the real world.42 
Ultimately, however, we should at least try and get a more holistic 
understanding of the system we are looking at. There is a real 
difference between accepting reduction because of practical limits and 
reduction as per Occam’s razor.43 So, go out, talk to people, observe 
them working technological systems, become embedded in the 
system.  
We now touch upon a deeper issue, namely: what is knowledge? I’m 
still with Byrne, who uses the Slav word ‘nauk’ to indicate that all 
forms of organized knowledge are necessary for a better 
understanding of complex systems44 – and that includes the 
experiential knowledge of the people working within those socio-
technological systems. I think that the German word ‘Wissenschaft’, 
the art of knowing, is actually a pretty good term because it seems 
broader than the rather narrow term ‘science’.  
                                                 
40 Among others Byrne (2002; 2004), Byrne and Ragin (2009), and Castellani and 
Hafferty (2009) have done a very good job of explaining what complexity-informed 
methods are and how they work.  
41 2002: 42 
42 Cilliers (2002) 
43 I’ve expanded on this argument in Gerrits (2012) 
44 Byrne (2002) 
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In my view, complexity-informed science manages to make that 
qualitative jump from rule-based, decontextualized understanding (in 
itself an important step), to the experienced-based, contextual 
understanding of such systems; in other words: to combine cognitive 
understanding with intuition as a valid source of knowledge. That 
combination is necessary to move from data to knowledge to 
expertise. Intuition appears to sit uncomfortably with science but let 
me stress that I’m not talking about simple, irrational guess work.45 46 
What I mean is an understanding of how complex systems work, in 
the terms of knowing how it works without having to deploy complex 
models or the conceptual jargon of complex systems. System theorists 
such as Checkland47 and Vennix48 have demonstrated quite well how 
experiential knowledge gives access to the complexity underlying 
socio-technological systems. Also, it doesn’t mean that other 
approaches have been rendered invalid – not at all! All I would like 
point out is that we can’t just limit ourselves with decontextualized 
research.  
People familiar with researching complex systems will note that I 
have skipped over the most dominant approach: modeling, nowadays 
sometimes occurring in combination with the processing of big data. 
Let me say a few things about this before wrapping this theme up. 
In understanding complex systems, we can deploy e.g. agent-based 
simulations to understand emergent properties, or use system 
dynamics modeling in order to understand feedback loops. The 
problem with modeling socio-technological systems is that it suggests 
that the model can be used to predict outcomes, to show that if you do 
this and that will be the outcome. This is a popular understanding in 
policy-making: if I implement policy x, then the outcome will be y, 
where you are free to fill in the blanks. The observation that such 
models have performed poorly in predicting human behavior beyond 
the most banal level aside, it has been show that such models suffer 
from, among others, confirmation bias and lack of context. That does 
                                                 
45 See e.g. Byrne (2011) for an expanded argument. 
46 Flyvbjerg (2001) already mentioned the problem of the ongoing ‘technocratization’ in 
science when scientists specialize in finely-grained technical and methodological aspects 
but forget about real-world correspondence. This is partly inevitable because of the 
dynamics of today’s scientific world and associated career pathways. But that should not 
deter us from still going outside and getting dirty! 
47 Checkland (1981) 
48 Vennix (1996) 
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not mean that such models are useless.  On the contrary. It just 
means that we are asking the wrong questions from such models.  
Models are primarily a means to promote thinking and 
communicating about complexity.49 As Klein said: modeling forces us 
to become clear about the assumptions and blind spots we have 
regarding the system under scrutiny.50 I find this particularly useful 
in the social sciences where concepts can (and often do) mean slightly 
different things in specific circumstances or in such instances where 
the researchers were not completely certain about what they were 
trying to convey. Models bring, even enforce, that clarity.  
Computational models also have an explorative and creative function. 
They provide a template with which we can play around, try out some 
ideas and poke around in things we don’t quite understand yet. And 
in doing so, in tapping into that creativity, I would suggest not just to 
stick to the serious type of modeling such as agent-based modeling 
and system dynamics modeling but also to play with game-like 
simulators. I’m certain that spending a day with the Mini Metro game 
or with City: Skylines will provide you with considerable appreciation 
and understanding of traffic allocation problems or the need for 
balance in generating quality of life in cities.  
One example of the intersection between modeling, complexity and 
politics is Virtuocity. It is in use by urban planners in order to try out 
different designs for public space. It can even be used as a tool for 
participatory decision-making. As mentioned before, experts often 
complain that your average citizen has no real understanding of the 
complexity of certain tasks. In the case of Tilburg51, the whole 
planning process was reversed. Citizens were invited to submit their 
ideas for the neighborhood. The planners and programmers then 
converted these ideas into virtual models in which you could walk 
around and see how good (or bad…) your plan was. Votes could be 
casted for all versions, ultimately leading to a final design that was in 
many ways quite bottom-up. The net result was that citizens felt that 
they had a real input on the shape of their town.52  
 
 
                                                 
49 Epstein (2008)  
50 Klein (2015)  
51 Moody (2010) 
52 Ibid. 
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8 FOR THE LOVE OF COMPLEXITY 
 
By now, it will be clear that I favor an appreciation of complexity. Yes, 
it doesn’t make our life easier – not directly at least – but neither does 
denying complexity. And what is there not to love? As Claus Carbon 
and colleagues, cognitive psychologists at our university, have shown, 
a certain degree of complexity, as expressed in novelty, ambiguity, 
uncertainty and conflict53 is very much appreciated, if only because 
we find it interesting and because it stimulates the brain. And last but 
not least, the higher effort necessary to understand complexity gives 
us bigger rewards when we do so. The research of our colleagues 
concerns aesthetic complexity but I sense that there are great 
similarities between the “certain amount of disorientation”54 offered 
by complex art and the same disorientation encountered when 
looking at social complexity and none of our theories seem to work as 
advertised. I think that the reward system also works for those that 
have mastered complexity as researchers or as practitioners.  
Aesthetics aside, I’m actually much more concerned about the fact 
that denial of said complexity enlarges our veil of ignorance. If we 
don’t understand how complexity works, we will keep developing 
misguided policies, projects and plans. Unfortunately, the world is 
littered with examples of politicians, civil servants and other actors 
embarking on projects and policies that turned out to be quite costly 
or even downright impossible because they were ignorant of the 
actual complexity. And as could be expected from my discussion so 
far, this doesn’t only concern the technological complexity but also 
the social complexity and the interaction between them. One only 
needs to look at cases such as Stuttgart 21 to understand that societal 
dynamics not exogenous to a project, they are part of the whole 
system. 
Don’t be naïve, mind. We should understand that there are other 
interests to be served than the greater good. As Flyvbjerg and 
colleagues demonstrated: political aspirations, business interests and 
lying consultants can create a vicious combination under which 
                                                 
53 Muth, Hesslinger & Carbon (2015) 
54 Berlyne (1971) 
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certain doomed projects are hatched.55 Then again, if we are sincere 
in our attempts and committed to a sensible use of public funds, we 
better start appreciating complexity. And that is exactly the message I 
would like to leave you with: embrace the complexity, make it work.  
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55 Flyvbjerg et al. (2002) 
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